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Abstract
Signaling games are central to the study of politics but often have multiple equilibria,
leading to no definitive empirical prediction. We demonstrate that these indeterminacies
create substantial problems for currently used maximum likelihood techniques: they fail
to uncover the parameters of the canonical crisis-signaling game, regardless of sample
size, even if the equilibrium in the game generating the data is unique. To overcome
this problem, we propose three estimators that outperform current best practices and
are well suited to problems in international relations. We fit a signaling model to data
on economic sanctions and find that standard maximum likelihood produces unintuitive
estimates that are highly sensitive to modeling or software choices. Our solutions remedy
the problems and uncover a novel U -shaped relationship between audience costs and the
propensity for leaders to threaten sanctions.
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1 Introduction
Political scientists use signaling games to analyze a variety of phenomena across prac-
tically all subfields. Due to their importance in the crisis-bargaining literature, scholars of
international relations structurally estimate increasingly more complicated signaling models
to answer questions about sanction threats, crisis-escalation, audience costs, and more (Bas,
Signorino and Whang 2014; Kurizaki and Whang 2015; Lewis and Schultz 2003; Wand 2006;
Whang 2010; Whang, McLean and Kuberski 2013). Advocated by the movement for empir-
ical implications of theoretical models, the structural approach allows researchers to account
for strategic interdependence in the data generating process, estimate theoretical parameters,
e.g., audience costs, and conduct counterfactual policy analysis in the absence of experimental
conditions.
Despite this ubiquity and usefulness, political scientists have yet to overcome two substan-
tial hurdles that arise when estimating signaling games. First, previous endeavors adopt a
variant of the ML routines in Signorino (1999). These routines maximize a likelihood func-
tion which computes an equilibrium for every observation at every guess of the parameters.
While straightforward, the procedure sidesteps a substantial problem in practice: An equi-
librium is computed as if it is unique. When multiple equilibria exist—a possibility in these
games—they create an indeterminacy in the likelihood, leading to inconsistent estimates (Jo
2011a). Second, even if a selection rule guaranteeing uniqueness were imposed, MLE can be
computationally inefficient because multiple equilibria create discontinuities in the likelihood
function and because current routines repeatedly compute equilibria in a resource-intensive
manner. Due to these feasibility concerns, several scholars abandon the structural enterprise
for reduced-form alternatives (Gleditsch et al. 2016; Trager and Vavreck 2011).
In this paper, we study the canonical signaling model of discrete crisis bargaining in in-
ternational relations and illustrate the pitfalls that multiple equilibria create when estimating
these games. In particular, we demonstrate that current best practices return incorrect esti-
mates not only when there are multiple equilibria in the signaling game generating the data
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but also when the equilibrium is unique. In the latter case, MLE fails because it evaluates
likelihood functions at parameter guesses that produce multiple equilibria. To overcome these
pitfalls, we adapt three estimators from the dynamic games and industrial organization liter-
ature, where equilibrium multiplicity is well known (e.g., De Paula 2013; Ellickson and Misra
2011). The estimators are data-driven in the sense that they use observables to estimate key
parameters describing equilibrium play, allowing us to back out the exogenous parameters
of interest without specifying an equilibrium selection rule. Because the estimators lead to
well-defined empirical models, they vastly outperform current best practices. Through a series
of experiments and applications, we argue that these solutions are quite well suited for the
simpler, but far more influential, models in political science.
In doing so, this paper makes several contributions to the methodology and international
relations literatures. Our analysis should give researchers pause when following current best
practices for estimating crisis-signaling games (Whang 2010; Whang, McLean and Kuberski
2013). Instead, we offer three alternatives that are computationally more feasible, better
performing in finite samples (reducing mean-squared error by orders of magnitude), and im-
plemented using the open-sourced R programing language. Additionally, our approaches do
not require equilibrium computation or selection, making them less sensitive to pre-estimation
modeling or software choices. Furthermore, while we focus on signaling games, the estima-
tors can also be used for other games with multiple equilibria, e.g., those with simultaneous
moves.1
Although others have noted the problems that can arise with multiple equilibria and
traditional MLE (Jo 2011a; Signorino 1999), solutions for researchers are scarce.2 There is a
misconception that ML techniques perform well if there is a unique equilibrium in the signaling
1MLE is also standard for estimating the extensive-form QRE models in McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)
and Signorino (1999). Because these games always have a unique equilibrium, the problems we discuss do not
arise in these contexts.
2Signorino (1999) concludes, “An important question then is: Given multiple equilibria, how are we
to assign probabilities over outcomes? This is a surprisingly little-studied area in political science or in
econometrics, but it must be addressed if we are to conduct similar statistical analyses of more realistic
models of international interaction.”
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game generating the data (Bas, Signorino and Whang 2014; Jo 2011a). As we show below,
this conclusion relies on finding starting values for optimization routines that are sufficiently
close to the true values in the data generating process. Without privileged starting values,
likelihood functions may be evaluated at parameters in which there are multiple equilibria,
leading to the problems discussed above. In fact, MLE shows consistently poor performance
even with a global optimization routine and a unique equilibrium in the game generating the
data. To avoid these problems, Jo (2011a) suggests that refinements may reduce the number
of equilibria. We show formally that almost all equilibria of the crisis-signaling game satisfy a
regularity condition, one of the strongest refinements in the literature, however. If researchers
want to reduce the number of equilibria a priori, then ad hoc selection is required. We
show how this type of selection can lead to discontinuous likelihood functions and additional
computational complexities, dramatically reducing the feasibility of traditional methods.
Our empirical application relates to recent debates over the effects of audience costs on the
initiation of international crises (Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco 2017; Kurizaki and Whang 2015;
Schultz 1999; Weeks 2012). We fit a crisis-signaling model to data on economic sanctions and
uncover a novel U -shaped relationship between audience costs, i.e., the costs leaders pay for
backing down in a crisis that they initiated, and the likelihood of leaders to threaten sanctions.
Leaders with large or small audience costs more freely threaten sanctions, as the former
can credibly commit to such threats and the latter need not worry about the consequences
of backing down. In contrast, leaders with moderate audience costs almost never threaten
sanctions because their threats are less credible and backing down entails nontrivial costs.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that the vast majority of observations are located on the left-
hand-side of the U -shaped curve. That is, larger (more negative) audience costs increase the
likelihood of leaders to initiate threats, a result which holds in 97% of observations and is
significant at conventional levels.
3
2 Model
We consider the canonical signaling game in discrete choice crisis bargaining. Throughout,
we adopt the specification from Lewis and Schultz (2003) and follow their notation. Several
scholars have built upon their initial effort by modifying the assumptions governing private
information (Bas, Signorino and Whang 2014; Wand 2006; Whang 2010). Nonetheless, the
structure of the model appears in a variety of settings (Gurantz and Hirsch 2017; Kurizaki
2007; Schultz 1999).
There are two states A and B competing over a good or a policy that is currently owned
or controlled by B. At the beginning of the game, the states observe private information.
State A observes (εA, εa), where εA and εa are additively separable payoff shocks to A’s utility
for war and backing down, respectively. Likewise, B observes εB which is an additively sepa-
rable payoff shock to its war utility. All shocks are independently and identically distributed
according to the standard normal distribution.
Interaction proceeds according to Figure 1. First, A decides whether or not to challenge
B for control over the good or policy, and if A does not challenge, then the game ends at node
SQ with payoffs Si for each state i. Second, after a challenge, B decides whether or not to
resist A. If B does not resist, i.e., B concedes to A’s demands, then the game ends at node
CD, and payoffs are VA and CB for states A and B, respectively. Finally, if B does resist,
then A must decide whether to fight or not. When A fights or stands firm, the states receive
W¯i + εi at node SF . Similarly, when A backs down and does not fight, the games ends at
node BD with A receiving a¯+ εa and B receiving VB.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria (equilibria, hereafter) for the game can be represented as
choice probabilities. Let pC and pF denote the probability that A challenges and fights
B, respectively, and let pR denote the probability B resists. Let p = (pC , pR, pF ) denote
a profile of choice probabilities. Furthermore, let θ denote the vector of payoffs, i.e., θ =(
a¯, CB,
(
Si, Vi, W¯i
)
i=A,B
)
. The following result is due to Jo (2011a) and characterizes the
equilibria of the game in terms of a system of nonlinear equations.
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Figure 1: The canonical crisis-signaling game.
A
B SQ
(SA, SB)
ACD
(VA, CB)
BD
(a¯+ εa, VB)
SF(
W¯A + εA, W¯B + εB
)
Challenge Not challenge
ResistNot resist
Fight Not fight
Result 1 (Jo, 2011a) An equilibrium p˜ exists, and p˜ is an equilibrium if and only if it satisfies
the following system of equations:
p˜C = 1− Φ
(
SA − (1− p˜R)VA
p˜R
− W¯A
)
Φ
(
SA − (1− p˜R)VA
p˜R
− a¯
)
≡ g(p˜R; θ), (1)
p˜F = Φ2
(
W¯A − a¯√
2
, W¯A − SA − (1− p˜R)VA
p˜R
,
1√
2
)
(g(p˜R; θ))
−1 ≡ h(p˜R; θ), (2)
and
p˜R = Φ
(
h(p˜R; θ)W¯B + (1− h(p˜R; θ))VB − CB
h(p˜R; θ)
)
≡ f ◦ h(p˜R; θ). (3)
In words, for a fixed θ, an equilibrium is completely pinned down by B’s probability of
resisting. In addition, the functions f , g, and h are best-response functions. Specifically, the
functions g and h compute A’s best response to B’s probability of resisting pR, and function
f denotes B’s best response to A’s probability of fighting. Furthermore, Jo (2011a) illustrates
that multiple equilibria exist in a nontrivial set of parameters, i.e., there exists several solutions
to the equation f ◦ h(pR; θ) = pR.
Throughout, we refer to high-stakes games as those where concessions are sufficiently
valuable, i.e., a game is high-stakes if VB > CB and VA > SA. In words, this condition means
that the initiating country A prefers B’s concession (outcome CD) to the status-quo (outcome
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SQ). Likewise, the target country B prefers A backing down in the game (outcome BD) to
initially conceding to A (outcome CD). Notice that the condition does not limit how costly
the war payoffs can be nor A’s own cost of backing down. High-stakes games are a natural
way to think about this game and match the intuitive restrictions discussed in Schultz and
Lewis (2005, p. 123–4). As we discuss below, high-stakes games are overwhelmingly prevalent
in our empirical application.
3 Estimation: Problems and Solutions
We consider D independent dyads or games. For each dyad d, researchers observe explana-
tory variables xd. These observed variables, along with the true structural parameters, β
∗,
determine the system of equations defining equilibria. In the standard manner, the variables
xd and parameters β determine the model’s payoffs, θ, which we parameterize as follows:
θ(xd, β) =

SdA
SdB
VdA
CdB
W¯dA
W¯dB
a¯d
VdB

=

xdSA · βSA
0
xdVA · βVA
xdCB · βCB
xdW¯A · βW¯A
xdW¯B · βW¯B
xda¯ · βa¯
xdVB · βVB

, (4)
where θ(xd, β
∗) are the true payoffs in the data generating process. Each xd vector above
contains zero or more explanatory variables. As in Lewis and Schultz (2003), identification
depends on there being at least one variable (including the constant) for each player that does
not appear in all of that player’s utilities.
Hereafter, we are interested in the β parameters that are common across all games, rather
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Table 1: Parameters for Monte Carlo experiments.
Utility Multiple equilibria Unique equilibrium
SdA 0 0
SdB 0 0
VdA 1 1
CdB 0 0
W¯dA −1.9 −1.8
VdB 1 1
W¯dB −2.9 + 0.1xd −2.45 + 0.1xd
a¯d −1.2 −1.2
than θd. Let g(pdR;xd, β), h(pdR;xd, β), and f(pdF ;xd, β) denote Result 1’s equations that
are parametrized by payoffs θ(xd, β), and dyad d’s data generating equilibrium is labeled
p∗(xd, β∗) = (p∗dC , p
∗
dF , p
∗
dR). Furthermore, researchers observe T ≥ 1 observations from each
equilibrium, where for each dyad d and observation t, an outcome ydt is a terminal node,
ydt ∈ {SQ,CD, SF,BD}.3
Throughout it will be helpful to consider two numerical examples. Table 1 contains two
sets of parameters that we use to demonstrate cases of unique and multiple equilibria. In
both settings we include one regressor, which enters B’s war payoff, specifically, W¯dB =
β1
W¯B
+ β2
W¯B
xd. The regressor xd is distributed uniformly over the unit interval. The first
column includes values which are identical to those in Jo (2011a), while the second column
tweaks these values slightly to create a scenario where the underlying game has a unique
equilibrium.
There are three things to notice about the parameters in Table 1. First, we normalize
the status-quo payoffs Si and B’s concession payoff to zero, following standard identification
assumptions (Bas, Signorino and Whang 2014; Jo 2011a; Lewis and Schultz 2003). Second,
3We assume that two states play from the same equilibrium conditional on xd, rather than allowing the
equilibrium to vary over within-game observations. The assumption reflects an anarchic international system in
which states find it difficult to repeatably coordinate on different equilibria due strategic reasons. Furthermore,
several forces may incentivize states to focus on a single equilibrium over time, including persistent international
norms/institutions (Keohane 1984), a focal point specific to these two states (Schelling 1960), or other factors
that emerge from their long time spans and repeated interaction. We discuss possibilities for future work that
would relax this assumption in the conclusion.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium correspondences for numerical examples
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Caption: The x-axis denotes the value of the regressor xd, and the y-axis denotes the solutions to Equation
3 in Result 1 when the remaining parameters take values in Table 1. Solutions are computed using a line-
search method. Colors and shapes denote the equilibrium selection the numerical examples and Monte Carlo
experiments.
the differences in the two columns are minor: by making small adjustments to the parameters
we can easily move into and out of situations were multiple equilibria exist. Third, these
parameters reflect reasonable payoffs. The games in both columns are high-stakes. In addition,
both war and backing down from threats are worse than the status quo, and actors only receive
positive payoffs when their opponent backs down.
To illustrate the two settings, Figure 2 graphs the game’s equilibrium correspondence as
we vary the single regressor xd along the x-axis. The figure’s y-axis denotes B’s equilibrium
probability of resisting, which completely pins down an equilibrium in the game by Result 1.
In the left-hand panel of Figure 2, there are multiple solutions to Equation 3 in Result 1 for
values of xd between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the orange triangles in the plots illustrate how we
determine which equilibria generate the data in our Monte Carlo experiments. Specifically,
when xd ∈
[
0, 1
3
)
, we use the smallest equilibrium probability of resisting pR to generate
the data for dyad d. When xd ∈
(
2
3
, 1
]
, we use the largest. Finally, we use the moderate
equilibrium in the remaining case. The right-hand side of Figure 2 graphs the equilibrium
correspondence under parameters shown in the third column of Table 1, where there is an
unique equilibrium for all values of xd.
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The goal is to estimate β∗. We first explicate the commonly used ML approach. Subse-
quently, we adapt three estimators from the dynamic games literature to the crisis-signaling
environment. Our three proposals are data driven in the sense that they use observed data
to uncover each dyad’s data generating equilibrium even though multiple ones may exist in
the signaling game governing the data generating process. Broadly speaking, we consider two
classes of estimators. One class consists of pseudo-likelihood procedures where we use ob-
served covariates across dyads to identify key characteristics describing equilibria generating
the data. The parameters of interest are subsequently pinned down in a second stage fixing
these estimated equilibrium characteristics. In contrast, the second class is a full-information
approach where we maximize a likelihood subject to constraints that describe equilibrium
play. Here, we use repeated observations within each game to simultaneously estimate the
equilibrium generating the data and the parameters that describe equilibrium constraints.
3.1 Problems with traditional MLE
The current best practices in the literature closely follow the ML techniques discussed in
Signorino (1999) and Rust (1987). For every β, an equilibrium to game d is computed by
solving the system of equations in Result 1; call this solution p(xd, β). Note that this solution
is not necessarily unique, and following standard practices, we do not search for all solutions.
Technically, p(xd, β) is a “function” that maps from data and parameters into equilibrium
choice probabilities.
Using p(xd, β), we define the probability of reaching each of the terminal nodes as
Pr[ydt | p(xd, β)] =

(1− pdC) if ydt = SQ
pdC(1− pdR) if ydt = CD
pdCpdR(1− pdF ) if ydt = BD
pdCpdRpdF if ydt = SF.
(5)
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Under this setup, the log-likelihood takes the form
L(θ | Y ) =
D∑
d=1
T∑
t=1
log Pr[ydt | p(xd, β)], (6)
and the traditional ML (tML) estimates maximize this log-likelihood.
As described in Jo (2011a), the current approach evaluates the likelihood function as if a
unique equilibrium exists. That is, for each guess of the parameters, we compute an equilib-
rium, p(xd, β), using a standard (numeric) equation solver. If there are multiple equilibria,
then there is an indeterminacy in how analysts evaluate p(xd, β). If the equation solver of
choice selects the wrong equilibrium, i.e., not the one in the data generating process, then the
likelihood is computed incorrectly, resulting in mistaken inferences. To better see this prob-
lem, suppose there are D dyads, and fixing parameters β, suppose each dyad admits n > 1
equilibria. In this case there are nD possible values of the log-likelihood for one parameter
value, as each dyad may be playing any one of the n equilibria. Standard equation solvers
return just one of the nD combinations. As D increases, it is increasingly implausible that the
correct selection is made.4 An implication of this discussion is that two researchers can reach
conflicting conclusions even when analyzing the same data if they implement the tMLE with
different equation solvers. We illustrate this problem in our empirical application.
Before proceeding, we consider potential fixes to the traditional MLE approach and discuss
why they are not appropriate solutions. To this end, we first ask: Can multiplicity in the crisis-
signaling game be solved with traditional refinements? If we can use a principled refinement
to produce a unique equilibrium, then traditional ML techniques can be safely used so long
as they are adjusted to always select the surviving equilibrium. Standard refinements based
on off-the-path-of-play beliefs, such as the Intuitive Criterion or Divinity, are inconsequential
here as all histories are reached with positive probability in every equilibrium. Because of
4Global optimization does not solve this problem. Even if the optimizer guesses the true value, the
underlying equation solver may not find the correct equilibrium for each observation, leading the optimizer
away from the truth.
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this, an analyst may be tempted to use a refinement called regularity, (e.g., Doraszelski and
Escobar 2010; Harsanyi 1973; van Damme 1996), which subsumes several other refinements,
including perfection, essentialness, and strong stability.5 Unfortunately, the refinement does
not solve the multiplicity in this game. As we show in Appendix A, for almost all param-
eter values, all equilibria of the crisis-signaling game satisfy regularity.6 Most importantly,
the result demonstrates that the problem with multiple equilibria cannot be “refined away”
using standard criteria, and the predictive indeterminacy that plagues traditional maximum
likelihood methods still persists.
With traditional refinements unavailable, an analyst might consider other possible selection
mechanisms. Some options could be selecting the equilibrium that maximizes a convex sum of
A and B’s payoffs or the equilibrium that solves max p˜R. A straightforward approach would
be to select the equilibrium that maximizes each dyad d’s contribution to the likelifor all
dhood. Such criteria might remove the indeterminacy in p(xd, β), resulting in a well-defined
likelihood. This approach has several drawback, however. First, this selection process forces an
additional and consequential modeling choice onto the analyst, one that can heavily influence
the resulting estimates. In our empirical application, we show how equilibrium selection
can dramatically change substantive conclusions. Second, without further theoretical results,
researchers would need to compute all equilibria and then verify which one satisfies their
criterion, a computationally demanding task. Third, imposing a selection criterion introduces
discontinuities in the likelihood function as the number of equilibria and hence the solution
to the criterion varies across different parameter values.
To better illustrate this last point consider Figure 3. Here, we graph the log-likelihood
as a function of the parameter βˆ1
W¯B
, where data were generated using the values in Table 1,
column 1, the equilibrium selection in Figure 2, and D ∈ {1, 10} with T = 200. Furthermore,
5For a formal definition, see Appendix A. There are additional reasons to focus on regular equilibria.
They can be implicitly expressed as continuous functions of parameters. As such, if we uncover noisy, but
sufficiently accurate estimates of θ, then equilibrium choice probabilities will be close to their true values as
well. Likewise, comparative statics (predicted probabilities) on regular equilibria will be well behaved.
6We say that a property holds for almost all parameters θ, if it does not hold at most in a closed, Lebesgue-
measure-zero subset of R8.
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Figure 3: Log-likelihood function with an imposed selection rule
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Caption: The x-axis denotes the value of the estimate of βˆ1
W¯B
, where the true value is −2.9. The y-axis
corresponds to the value of the log-likelihood maximized over all equilibria. All other parameters are held at
their true values. To generate the data, we fix T = 200 and use the parameters in Table 1, column 1, and the
selection rule in Figure 2.
for each dyad d and each value of βˆ1
W¯B
along the x-axis, we compute all equilibria and select
the one that maximizes the log-likelihood, which is denoted by the y-axis. This selection
rule represents the best case for traditional methods, but requires additional computational
costs as we repeatedly solve the system of equations describing equilibrium play. Although
this selection rule removes the indeterminacy that multiple equilibria induce and correctly
identifies the true value of β1
W¯B
, it creates a discontinuous likelihood function. Furthermore, as
D increases, so do the number of discontinuities and the number of equilibrium computations.
The problems are further exacerbated if we were to estimate more than one parameter. The
three estimators we propose below avoid these issues. Not only do they lead to well-defined
empirical models and objective functions, but also they do not burden the researcher by
requiring a selection rule or the repeated computation of equilibria.
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3.2 Pseudo-likelihoods
Our first proposal involves the two-step estimator from Hotz and Miller (1993), which
is also analyzed as a special case in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007).7 In the first step, we
produce consistent (in T or D) estimates of the equilibrium choice probabilities p∗dR and p
∗
dF ,
for d = 1, ..., D. We label these estimates pˆR = (pˆ1R, ..., pˆDR) and pˆF = (pˆ1F , ..., pˆDF ). Ideally,
this step is done either non-parametrically or with an extremely flexible estimator. While
we are agnostic about how to obtain the first-stage estimates in practice, a non-parametric
frequency estimator may be preferred when T is large. When dealing with smaller samples,
however, flexible methods that pool information between games, such as kernel regression,
basis functions, or generalized additive models, may be needed. We use a random forest to
produce first-stage estimates throughout our analysis.
Next, we can consider how actors best respond to these first-stage estimates. These best
responses are computed using the equations in Result 1, which take the form:
pˆ(pˆdR, pˆdF ;xd, β) =

g(pˆdR;xd, β)
h(pˆdR;xd, β)
f(pˆdF ;xd, β)
 . (7)
In other words, if actors play the game as if they believed their opponents use strategies
estimated in the first stage, pˆdR and pˆdF , then pˆ are their best responses. These best-responses
approach their true values, as the first-stage estimates become more precise. Using the first-
stage estimates and the associated best-responses, we build the pseudo-log-likelihood function
7Another possible two-step estimator is a nonlinear least squares approach based on Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In Monte Carlo simulations, the least-squares estimator performed poorly compared
to the three likelihood estimators we introduce. These performance issues appear to result from highly nonlin-
ear and numerically unstable first derivatives. Because of these issues, we do not include it here and discourage
its use with this game.
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as
PL(β | pˆR, pˆF, Y,X) =
D∑
d=1
T∑
t=1
log Pr[ydt | pˆ(pˆdR, pˆdF ;xd, β)]. (8)
Notice that when the first-stage estimates equal the equilibrium choice probabilities, the
pseudo-log-likelihood is the log-likelihood for Equation 6 with the correct equilibrium se-
lection.
3.2.1 Nested Pseudo-Likelihood
The NPL approach, proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), builds on the PL by using
best responses to update the first-stage choice probabilities upon knowing the PL estimates.
This process is repeated until convergence. More precisely, the NPL algorithm begins with
the PL estimates,
(βˆNPL0 , pˆR,0, pˆF,0) = (βˆ
PL, pˆR, pˆF),
and for the kth iteration, we set
pˆdF,k = h(pˆdR,k−1;xd, βk−1), d = 1, . . . , D
pˆdR,k = f(pˆdF,k−1;xd, βk−1), d = 1, . . . , D
βˆNPLk = argmax
β
PL(β | pˆR,k, pˆF,k, Y,X).
The algorithm is repeated until the parameters and choice probabilities cease changing (subject
to a pre-specified step-tolerance). As discussed in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), the NPL
approach reduces the analyst’s reliance on correct first-stage estimates and is more efficient
than the PL estimator when the first-stage estimates are imprecise.
However, the NPL algorithm is not costless: without a particular stability condition on the
data generating process, the algorithm may fail to converge (Kasahara and Shimotsu 2012;
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler 2010). Specifically, we need to be concerned with whether
14
the data generating equilibria are best-response stable. If an equilibrium is best-response
stable, then repeatedly evaluating the function f ◦ h will coverage to the equilibrium as long
as the starting value is not too far away. In contrast, if the data generating equilibrium is
unstable, then best-response iteration will not converge to the true equilibrium unless it does
so in a finite number of steps. We provide formal definitions of stable and unstable equilibria
in the Supplementary Materials.
This concern raises the question as to whether best-response stable or unstable equilibria
appear in the underlying game? Restricting our attention to just high-stakes games, we show
that if there is a unique equilibrium, it is best-response stable. However, if there are multiple
equilibria, then there exists at least one best-response unstable equilibrium and at least two
best-response unstable equilibria.8 As both pseudo-likelihood methods rely on computing at
least one best response, we analyze the degree to which these methods are sensitive to unstable
equilibria in a Monte Carlo experiment in Appendix B.3, where we find that both the PL and
the NPL perform quite well even if best-response unstable equilibria dominate in the data.
3.3 Constrained MLE
An alternative approach is to use a full-information CMLE, as proposed by (Su and Judd
2012). Applied to this problem, we maximize the likelihood in Equation 6 subject to the
equilibrium constraints in Result 1. To do this we define
p¯(pdR;xd, β) =

g(pdR;xd, β)
h(pdR;xd, β)
pdR
 . (9)
8See Appendix A for the formal statements and proofs of these results.
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Then the CMLE estimates solve the following problem
max
β, pR
D∑
d=1
T∑
t=1
log Pr[ydt | p¯(pdR;xd, β)],
s.t. f ◦ h(pdR;xd, β) = pdR, d = 1, ..., D.
(10)
Su and Judd (2012) demonstrate that the CMLE is equivalent to an MLE procedure in
which analysts select the equilibrium that maximizes the likelihood of the observed data for
every guess of the parameters. Such a modification substantially reduces MLE’s feasibility,
however, for two of the reasons discussed above: it requires computing all equilibria and it pro-
duces a discontinuous likelihood function. The constrained approach avoids both problems.9
Unlike the pseudo-likelihood procedures there is no need to estimate choice probabilities sepa-
rately from the main parameters. This improves the estimator’s efficiency and eliminates the
potential bias resulting from model misspecification or unstable equilibria.
Note that the constrained optimization problem has D auxiliary parameters, which means
it may not be consistent in the number of dyads. In fact, if T = 1, then the estimator requires
more parameters than observations.10 For larger values of T , however, we gain leverage by
pooling over dyads. Intuitively, with more draws from the equilibrium within each dyad,
we learn the equilibrium choice probabilities with increasing certainty and can then uncover
β. Furthermore, our experiments demonstrate that the CMLE performs well even with a
moderate number of within game observations.
Another drawback of the CMLE is that solving the constrained optimization problem is
more computationally intense than either of the pseudo-likelihood estimators. In our Monte
Carlo simulations, an R implementation of the augmented Lagrangian method (Nocedal and
Wright 2006) performs well at solving the problem in Equation 10.11 More specialized—
9Notice that both the objective and constraint functions in Equation 10 are continuous in (β,pR). By not
requiring that pR satisfy the equilibrium condition at every guess of β, the CMLE ensures that the objective
function is well behaved. If (βˆ, pˆR) is a solution to the problem in Equation 10, then equilibrium constraint
is satisfied, i.e., f ◦ h(pdR;xd, β) = pdR for all dyads d.
10This is in contrast to the two pseudo-likelihood approaches, which can be used for the T = 1 case.
11This implementation can be found in R’s alabama package.
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but still open source— software performs even better in the simulations and is required to
reliably fit the CMLE to our economic sanctions data; complete implementation details are
in Appendix C.
4 Performance
We now evaluate the performance of the estimators under different numbers of equilibria in
the data generating process. We continue to use the parameter values from Table 1, where xd
is still distributed standard uniform. As a preview, the traditional MLE consistently performs
the worst, and the PL, NPL, and CMLE do quite well.
Recall that the pseudo-likelihood estimator requires first-stage estimates of equilibrium
choice probabilities. As mentioned above, we use a random forest, a flexible machine learning
technique, to produce these estimates. There are two models in the first-stage, where the
dependent variables are the nonparametric frequency estimates of the probability that B
resists (for pˆR) and A fights (for pˆF). We fit the former only with observations in which A
challenges, and we fit the latter only with observations in which B resists. For predictors, we
include the one regressor, xd.
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With our experimental conditions fixed, we now examine how the number of equilibria
affects the estimators. We vary the number of dyads, D, between 25 and 200 and the number
of within-game observation, T , between 5 and 200 to create simulated datasets of various sizes.
For each combination of D and T , we draw xd from the standard uniform distribution and
then select the appropriate equilibrium that generates the data for the corresponding dyad,
as shown in Figure 2. Finally, we use the simulated data to estimate the game using all four
estimators. We repeat this process for 1, 000 times for each pair of D and T and for each of
the parameter settings in Table 1.13
12Montgomery and Olivella (2017) have a recent discussion of tree-based models.
13Starting values were drawn from a standard uniform distribution. For the CMLE, starting values for pR
are the random forest estimates from the first-stage analysis, associated with the two-step estimators.
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Figure 4: RMSE in signaling estimators with multiple equilibria.
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The main results of the experiment are summarized in Figures 4 and 5, which compare the
logged root-mean-square error (RMSE) of the estimators.14 The first thing we note is that the
tMLE (blue, dashed line) performs consistently bad and shows no improvement as the amount
of data increases in either D or T . In many cases, its performance worsens as T increases.
In Appendices B.1 and B.2, we graph the bias and variance of the estimators as well as their
convergence rates and computational time. The graphs demonstrate that the bias associated
with the tMLE is an order of magnitude larger than its worst performing competitor. Further-
more, the large variance of the tMLE demonstrates that the optimization algorithm converges
on estimates scattered throughout the parameter space and is not routinely attracted to a
local minimum.15 Overall, we find that equilibrium selection is the root cause of the tMLE’s
14Multivariate mean-square error is calculated as tr(Var(βˆ)) + [βˆ − β∗]′[βˆ − β∗].
15As a robustness check, we also use a global optimizer for the tMLE routine. In a simulation with
T = D = 200 and using the unique equilibrium parameter values from Table 1, we optimize the tMLE
objective function with DEoptim (Mullen et al. 2011). While the global optimizer improves the tMLE’s
performance (RMSE of 10.04, compared to 17.42 in Figure 5), our three estimators continue to outperform it
with RMSE values of 2.44, 2.37, and 0.19 for the CMLE, PL, and NPL, respectively, even though the latter
methods use the less robust, albeit more computationally feasible, gradient-based optimizers.
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Figure 5: RMSE in signaling estimators with a unique equilibrium
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problems.
Contrast these results to those from the other estimators, which generally all improve with
more data. Of these three estimators, the PL (green, solid line) and NPL (pink, dot-dashed)
estimators perform remarkably well. The PL method is generally the best performing esti-
mator with small numbers of within-game observations, T . Additional analysis in Appendix
B shows that the estimator tends to have more bias than the others and that its strong per-
formance is driven by low variance. The NPL greatly improves the bias associated with the
PL method, without adding too much variance, and as a result, we see that it is the best
performing of our candidates, especially with large T . Finally, while the CMLE (red, dot-
ted line) typically outperforms the tMLE, it is also characterized by a low-bias-high-variance
trade-off, illustrated in Appendix B.1, which frequently makes it the worst performing of our
proposed solutions. When we use specialized software that provides first and second deriva-
tive information, the CMLE’s performance can greatly improve; see Appendix C for more
information.
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Notice that the results are quite consistent in both the multiple equilibria setting, i.e.,
Figure 4, and the unique equilibrium setting, i.e., Figure 5. The tMLE’s poor performance
in the unique setting is particularly surprising, because uniqueness is standard justification
for using the tMLE, as in Bas, Signorino and Whang (2014) and Jo (2011a). Furthermore,
both papers report Monte Carlo results that illustrate the consistent-like properties of the
tMLE routine with a unique equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, this occurs when the
tMLE routine begins with privileged starting values that are sufficiently close to those in the
data generating process. We investigate these differences in Appendix D. Without privileged
starting values, the tMLE routine will evaluate a likelihood function with parameters guesses
under which multiple equilibria exist, leading to difficulties uncovering the true values. Most
concerning, these problems persist regardless of the number of observations.
Before turning our attention to economic sanctions, we report the following conclusions.
1. The tMLE routine performs the worst in both multiple and unique settings, regardless
of the number of observations.
2. The NPL and PL methods consistently perform the best, but the PL out performs the
NPL when the number of within game observations is small, and vice versa when the
number of within game observations is large.
3. The CMLE has a small bias, large variance trade-off due to the highly nonlinear nature
of the constraint function. Its performance can be improved by using more advanced
tools.
5 Application to Economic Sanctions
Our empirical application is motivated by Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013, WMK,
hereafter) who structurally estimate the process of implementing sanctions as a signaling
interaction. The game is reproduced in Figure 6, where A’s actions at the first node are now
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whether or not to threaten sanctions, B then decides whether or not to resist, and finally A
must decide whether to follow through on its threat of sanctions. The outcomes are status
quo, concede to the threat, impose sanctions, and back down, which are denoted SQ, CD,
SF , and BD, respectively.
An observation in WMK is a politically relevant directed-dyad decade. A directed-dyad is
politically relevant if there exists at least one sanction threat issued from State A to State B in
the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset during the 1971–2000 period. Within
each directed dyad, the authors aggregate the temporal variation based on the most extreme
action taken in the decade, dividing the time frame into three groups 1971–80, 1981–90, and
1991–2000.
Like WMK, our analysis considers only politically relevant directed dyads. Unlike their
paper, we admit observations at the monthly level, but we treat observations within a directed-
dyad decade as if they were repeated draws from the same equilibrium.16 In terms of our setup,
a game is a politically relevant, directed dyad decade, and we observe T = 120 observations
from each game. For our purposes, this approach has two important advantages. First, the
CMLE procedure requires multiple observations within game for identification. Without this
setup, we could not illustrate this estimator even though it performed quite well in the Monte
Carlo experiments. Second, we do not ignore variation within each decade: a directed dyad
with only one threat issued in a decade may be substantially different than one with several
threats in the same period.
Such a setup is possible because the TIES data records the date of each action taken
within the dyad. Following WMK, we use the Final Outcome variable to record the outcomes
of each dyad-month. When there is no action in a month, we record the status quo, when
Final Outcome is 1, 2, or 5 we record the outcome as CD, a Final Outcome of 3 or 4 is BD,
and SF is recorded for outcomes 6 and above. After dropping irrelevant dyad-decades, we are
16A minor difference arising in our application is that WMK add normally distributed shocks to payoffs at
every terminal node, and they further estimate the covariance of these shocks. WMK not only report that
these covariance estimates are below 0.07 in magnitude, but also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
covariances are equal to zero at the p < 0.08 level.
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Figure 6: Economic sanctions as a signaling interaction.
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left with 418 games, each with 120 within game observations that span one of the three time
frames, 1971–80, 1981–90, and 1991–2000. The independent variables, their sources, and how
they enter the actors’ payoffs are listed in Table 2, following the specifications in WMK.
We estimate the model using all of the techniques discussed above with identical starting
values. In the application T > 100 and D > 25, so the Monte Carlo experiments suggest that
our proposed estimators, i.e., those besides the tMLE, should preform quite well. Following
the experimental procedures, we use a random forest and the variables in Table 2 to form
first-stage estimates for the pseudo-likelihood estimator; we also initialize the NPL method
with these estimates. For standard errors, we use a non-parametric bootstrap to estimate the
variance and covariance of the first-stage estimates. The first-stage variance-covariance matrix
is then used to compute the analytical standard errors described in Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007) for the PL estimator. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) also provide analytic standard
errors for the NPL estimator, which do not rely on the variance of the first-stage estimates.
Analytical standard errors for the CMLE are computed using (Silvey 1959, Lemma 6) and
the tMLE standard errors are from the outer-product of gradients estimator.
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Table 2: Variables in the economic sanctions model
Variable Utilities Description Source
Fixed to 0 SB, VB Identification restriction –
Constant VA, CB, W¯i, a¯ Omitted from SA for identification –
Econ. DepA SA, W¯A A’s economic dependence on B TIES
DemA SA, a¯, W¯A A’s Polity2 score Polity IV
Contiguity SA, CB Contiguity between the states COW
AllianceB VA, CB Alliance between the states (0/1) COW
CostsA VA Anticipated costs to A TIES
Econ. DepB CB B’s economic dependence on A TIES
CostsB CB Anticipated costs to B TIES
Cap. Ratio W¯i (log) ratio of A’s capabilities to B COW
DemB W¯B B’s Polity2 score Polity IV
5.1 Results
Table 3 displays our main results, where each column contains parameter estimates using
the different estimators. There are several notable patterns. First, the techniques derived
from the dynamic games literature produce estimates that agree in direction, magnitude, and
significance. Models 2–4 match signs for 16 out of 21 coefficients, and when we reject a null
hypothesis using one estimator, we generally do the same for one of the others. Second,
the tMLE returns estimates that diverge wildly from the other three. The problem appears
particularly bad for coefficients that enter the target state’s concession payoffs, CB. For
example, the tML estimates suggest that contiguity should decrease B’s payoff from conceding,
a result which is significant at conventional levels. In contrast, the models that accommodate
multiple equilibria all agree that continuity should increase B’s concessions payoffs, results
which are also significant at conventional levels.
Third, the tMLE routine produces substantive implications that are inconsistent with
previous findings and theoretical intuitions. Such inconsistencies do not arise with the three
estimators that explicitly accommodate multiple equilibria, however. In the MLE results,
for example, economic dependence is negative in B’s concession payoff, CB. This suggests
that greater dependence decreases the target state’s preference for peaceful resolutions over
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Table 3: Economic sanctions application
tML Pseudo-Likelihood Nested Pseudo Likelihood CMLE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
SA: Econ. DepA 0.05 −0.28 −0.22 −0.52
(0.29) (0.69) (1.11) (0.52)
SA: DemA 0.00 −0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03)
SA: Contiguity 0.27
∗ 0.01 0.05 0.04∗
(0.10) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
SA: Alliance −0.06 −0.18∗ −0.17 −0.16∗
(0.08) (0.03) (0.10) (0.07)
VA: Const. −0.06 −0.29 1.60 1.31∗
(0.08) (0.75) (1.65) (0.47)
VA: CostsA −0.04 0.37 −0.05 −0.19
(0.03) (0.27) (0.27) (0.17)
CB: Const. 0.81 −0.89∗ −2.14∗ −4.53∗
(0.91) (0.31) (0.80) (2.31)
CB: Econ. DepB −0.21 1.34∗ 2.34∗ 2.83∗
(0.16) (0.59) (1.11) (0.59)
CB: CostsB −0.08∗ 0.11 0.12 0.19∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
CB: Contiguity −0.25∗ 0.09∗ 0.12∗ 0.10∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
CB: Alliance 0.10 0.03 −0.03 −0.02
(0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
W¯A: Const. −0.15 −2.43∗ −2.42∗ −2.46∗
(0.78) (0.10) (0.13) (0.08)
W¯A: Econ. DepA 0.07 0.28 0.01 −0.05
(0.75) (0.92) (1.14) (0.18)
W¯A: DemA 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
W¯A: Cap. Ratio −0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
W¯B: Const. −0.38 0.51∗ −0.91 −4.42
(1.13) (0.25) (1.11) (3.15)
W¯B: DemB 0.01
∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.01∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
W¯B: Cap. Ratio 0.01 0.07 0.12
∗ 0.29∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12)
a¯: Const. −0.56 −2.63∗ −2.64∗ −2.71∗
(0.77) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08)
a¯: DemA 0.00 −0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
Log L -4102.76 -3964.53 -3932.45 -3927.91
N 418× 120 418× 120 418× 120 418× 120
Notes: ∗p < 0.05
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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escalation. Yet, the remaining estimators suggest the opposite. Here, more dependence implies
B should be more likely to prefer peace than escalation, a finding which closely matches
previous work (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008; Lektzian and Souva 2003; McLean and
Whang 2010). In a similar vein, using the estimates from Models 2–4, all observations are
high-stakes games, i.e., the point estimates of the payoffs satisfy the restrictions that VB > CB
and VA > SA. Using the estimates the MLE model, no observation is high-stakes.
For another example, consider audience costs, i.e., the initiating state’s payoff from backing
down, a¯. Notice that the relevant constant term is negative, significant, and large in magnitude
in all three models that accommodate multiple equilibria.17 This suggests that states or leaders
are indeed punished for backing down after issuing threats. In fact, in Models 2–4, we reject
the null hypothesis that audience costs are greater than zero at the p < 0.05 level in every
observation. In contrast, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that a¯ ≥ 0 in the MLE model
for any observation. Our analysis suggests that researchers may underestimate audience costs
if estimation techniques do not accommodate the multiplicity of equilibria.
Finally, to better illustrate the tMLE’s shortcomings, we also estimate the signaling model
with an identical tMLE routine using a different equation solver. In Model 1 from Table 3, we
use the nonlinear equation solver from our Monte Carlo experiments, which uses Broyden’s
method. In the second tMLE implementation, we compute all equilibria and select the one that
maximizes pdR. Appendix E details these results in Table 4.
18 Most surprisingly, the two tMLE
results diverge in both sign (for 9/20 estimates) and significance (for 13/20 estimates). Thus,
even when analyzing identical data sets, two researchers can reach substantively diverging
conclusions if they implement the tMLE using different equation solvers. This suggests that
estimates obtained through tMLE routines may be difficult to replicate or compare across
studies even with publicly available data.
Overall, the implication is clear: games with multiple equilibria create substantial hurdles
17The coefficient relating A’s democracy levels to its audiences costs is essentially zero even in the three
models that accommodate multiple equilibria. This matches recent work demonstrating that democracy is
neither necessary nor sufficient for audience costs (Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco 2017; Weeks 2008, 2012).
18Across the two tMLE routines, the optimization method and starting values were fixed.
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that tMLE approaches cannot overcome. Traditional methods for estimating signaling games
produce severely misleading point estimates and substantive implications. Researchers wishing
to estimate these types of models should choose methods that accommodate the possibility
of multiple equilibria.
5.2 Audience Costs and Comparative Statics
How do audience costs affect the likelihood of leaders threatening sanctions? On the
one hand, audience costs should discourage leaders from threatening rivals or initiating crises
because leaders anticipate backing down and receiving those larger costs (Kurizaki and Whang
2015; Weeks 2012). On the other hand, audience costs make threats more credible, forcing
rivals to concede, and as such, larger costs, and their associated bargaining advantages, should
encourage leaders to initiate threats (Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco 2017; Schultz 1999). In
the previous section, we analyzed point estimates of audience costs and found that they
can be substantial. In this section, we analyze their substantive effects on the equilibrium
probability of threatening sanctions, pC . Doing so demonstrates that structural estimation
and our proposed methods can help substantive scholars to uncover novel substantive findings
in international relations.
For a concrete example, we consider the directed dyad in which the U.S. is the initiating
state A and China is the target state B between 1991–2000, which is the most recent decade
in the data. We vary the U.S.’s audience cost, a¯, from −6 to 0 while fixing the remaining
payoffs estimated using Model 4 in Table 3.19 For every value of a¯, we compute all equilibria
using a line-search method. Then we plot the associated equilibrium probabilities of the
U.S. initiating a conflict, pC , in Figure 7. For all values of a¯ considered, there is a unique
equilibrium, pictured with the blue circles. The orange diamond denotes the value of U.S.
19We chose the CMLE in Model 4 for two reasons. First, unlike the PL method, the NPL and the CMLE,
upon convergence, produce equilibrium choice probabilities that satisfy the conditions in Result 1. Second,
comparing the CMLE and NPL results, the former have the larger log likelihood. Nonetheless, substantively
similar results hold if we use the NPL results.
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Figure 7: Effects of audience costs between U.S. and China dyad, 1991–2000
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Caption: For each fixed a¯, we compute all equilibria in the US-CHN-1990 directed dyad given the results
in Table 3, Model 4. We then plot equilibrium probabilities of intiating conflict, pC . The orange diamond
denotes the equilibrium estimated using the CMLE; there is a unique equilibrium for all displayed values of a¯.
audience costs estimated in the data, around −2.7, and the equilibrium estimate from the
CMLE.
The figure illustrates three notable results. First, audience costs have a large substantive
effect on the probability of threat initiation, covering the entire range between 0 and 1. Second,
there is a U -shaped relationship between audience costs and threat initiation. Leaders only
initiate threats when audience costs are very small or quite large. In the former case, leaders do
not pay a cost for backing down, and in the latter case, their threats are quite credible. With
intermediate audience costs, however, leaders almost never threaten rivals with sanctions, as
their threats are not credible and backing down entails nontrivial costs. Third, if we were
to increase the U.S.’s audience costs beginning from the value estimated in the data, then
the model predicts an increase in sanction threats toward China. That is, the true value of
audience costs tend to fall on the left-hand-side of the U -shaped curve, where larger (more
negative) audience costs increase the likelihood of interstate threats.
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How general is this latter pattern? That is, do larger audience costs encourage leaders
to threaten sanctions more generally or is there something unique about the U.S. and China
directed dyad? To answer these questions, we compute the marginal effect of making audience
costs, a¯, more negative on the equilibrium probability of issuing threats. Conclusively, larger
(more negative) audience costs increase the likelihood of states threatening their rivals with
sanctions. This result holds in 97% of observations, or 406 out of 418 dyads, and demonstrates
that the second countervailing effect of audience costs dominates in the economic sanctions
data. The median effect in the sample is 0.03, with a non-parametric 95% confidence interval
ranging from 0.0004 to 0.17. Linear interpolation suggests that if we double the size of audience
costs, i.e., move from a¯ ≈ −2.7 to a¯ ≈ −5.4, then the likelihood of threat initiation should
increase by 8.3 percentage points.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze problems that emerge when using standard ML techniques to
fit signaling games to data. We demonstrate that these techniques perform poorly not only
if there are multiple equilibria in the signaling game generating the data but also if the
equilibrium is unique. In the former case, without further information, the likelihood function
may select the wrong equilibrium when evaluating different parameter guesses, leading to
estimates that do not increase in accuracy with more observations. In the latter case, the
likelihood function will often times be evaluated at parameter guesses under which multiple
equilibria exist, leading to the similar problems unless starting values are sufficiently close to
those in the data generating process. Our analysis should give researchers pause before using
these techniques to estimate crisis-signaling games in international relations.
For solutions, we adapt several estimators from the dynamic games literature and show
that they are particularly useful for the crisis-signaling game. In a series of experiments and
applications, the NPL and PL always perform better than the currently used MLE routines
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and tend to outperform both the CMLE estimator. Although the CMLE can dramatically
reduce bias when compared to the PL and NPL methods, it tends to have estimates with
larger variances. This small bias large variance trade-off diminishes if researchers are able to
use specialized constrained optimization software. In general, we propose the following advice
when estimating crisis-signaling games.
1. Estimate the game with the PL method, using a flexible first-stage estimator. We rec-
ommend random forests, as they tend to outperform splines, basis expansion, regression
trees, and other flexible first-stage routines.
2. To verify whether bias in the first-stage estimates has affected the second stage, estimate
the game with either the NPL or CMLE techniques. If these converge with smaller
variances, then they should be prioritized. If these do not converge or have larger
variances, then the PL results should be prioritized.
3. The tMLE routine should not be used; it generally performs worse than the other pro-
cedures.
We implement these procedures in our computational appendix. This accessibility should
help researchers to uncover theoretically informed parameters rather than engaging in more
reduced-form analyses.
Finally, the analysis here raises an important avenue for future research. Throughout, we
have assumed that within each dyad or game, states play the same equilibrium for all within
period observations t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. However, it could be the case that the dyad switches
equilibria over time, that is, ydt and ydt′ were generated from two different equilibria for some
t 6= t′. If this equilibrium selection rule probabilistically depends on equilibrium properties
such as Pareto efficiency or the amount of updating, then scholars could attempt to model the
equilibrium selection as in Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2010). If this equilibrium selection rule is
arbitrary, then scholars could employ techniques that estimate identification bounds around
the coefficients of interest as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). Either approach would relax
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an assumption in our analysis. A major difficulty in this area is that current work considers
games of complete information, as these techniques require repeatedly enumerating the entire
set of equilibria. With incomplete information and signaling incentives, this task becomes
substantially more complicated.
Appendices
A Definitions, Results, and Proofs
This Appendix contains the formal arguments for two additional results discussed in the
main manuscript. First we define the regularity refinement from Harsanyi (1973) and van
Damme (1996).
Definition 1 An equilibrium p˜R is regular if δ (p˜R; θ) 6= 1.
With this definition we can now state our result concerning the regularity of equilibria.
Result 2 For almost all θ, all equilibria of the crisis-signaling game are regular.
To prove the result and subsequent ones, it is more straightforward to work with the
function F : (0, 1)× R8 → R such that
F (pR; θ) = f ◦ h(pR; θ)− pR,
where p˜R is an equilibrium if and only if F (p˜R; θ) = 0. Likewise, we will also use δ(pR; θ) to be
the first derivative of f ◦ h with respect to pR given parameters θ. We state two intermediary
results before proving result 2. The first is from Jo (2011a) and the second is the parameterized
Transversality Theorem.
Lemma 1 For all θ, limpR→0 f ◦ h(pR; θ) > 0 and limpR→1 f ◦ h(pR; θ) < 1.
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Thus, there are no equilibria at the boundaries. In addition, for any fixed θ, there exists
ε > 0 and ν > 0 such that F (ε; θ) > 0 and F (1− ν; θ) < 0
Theorem 1 (Transversality Theorem) Consider an open set X ⊆ Rn. Let L : X×Rs → Rn be
continuously differentiable. Assume that the Jacobian D(x,y)L has rank n for all (x, y) ∈ X×Rs
such that L(x, y) = 0. Then, for all most all y′ ∈ Rs, the Jacobian DxL has rank n for all
x ∈ X such that L(x, y′) = 0.
We now prove Result 2.
Proof of Result 2. Note that p˜R is a regular equilibrium if and only if DpRF (pR; θ) 6= 0.
To prove Result 2, we verify the conditions of the Transversality condition, where in our
application, L = F and (x, y) = (pR; θ), which means n = 1 and s = 8. First, note that F is
continuously differentiable, because f ◦h is the composition of normal cumulative distribution
functions and polynomial functions, and F is defined over the open interval (0, 1).
Third and finally, we show that D(pR;θ)F (pR; θ) has at least one non-zero element (i.e., rank
1) when F (pR; θ) = 0. To do this, we show a stronger result: for all (pR; θ), D(pR;θ)F (pR; θ) 6= 0.
To see this, consider DW¯BF (pR; θ). By Result 1, the functions g and h are constant in
parameter W¯B, that is, DW¯Bg(pR; θ) = DW¯Bh(pR; θ) = 0. Then we have
DW¯BF (pR; θ) = DW¯Bf ◦ h(pR; θ)
= DW¯BΦ
(
h(pR; θ)W¯B + (1− h(pR; θ))VB − CB
h(pR; θ)
)
= DW¯BΦ
(
W¯B +
(1− h(pR; θ))VB − CB
h(pR; θ)
)
= φ
(
W¯B +
(1− h(pR; θ))VB − CB
h(pR; θ)
)
6= 0,
which implies D(pR;θ)F (pR; θ) 6= 0 as required.
Although the regularity refinement does not generically reduce the number of equilibria,
showing that all the equilibria are regular is advantageous for applied empirical research.
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Regular equilibria can be implicitly expressed as continuous functions of parameters. This
property is particularly important in empirical analyses: if we uncover noisy, but sufficiently
accurate estimates of θ, then equilibrium choice probabilities will be close to their true values
as well. In addition, comparative statics (predicted probabilities) on regular equilibria will be
well behaved, i.e., the equilibrium will not vanish if we vary the data or parameters by some
small amount.
Our next result focuses on best response iteration. Before stating the result, we define
best-response stable and best-response unstable equilibria.
Definition 2 An equilibrium p˜R is best-response stable if there exists ε > 0 such that for all
p0R ∈ (p˜R − ε, p˜R + ε) the sequence
pkR = f ◦ h(pk−1R ; θ), k ∈ N
converges to p˜R.
The next definition introduces best-response unstable equilibria, which is not simply the nega-
tion of Definition 2.
Definition 3 An equilibrium p˜R is best-response unstable if there exists ε > 0 such that for
all p0R ∈ (p˜R − ε, p˜R + ε), with p0R 6= p˜R, the sequence
pkR = f ◦ h(pk−1R ; θ), k ∈ N
leaves the interval (p˜R − ε, p˜R + ε) at least once. That is, there exists n ∈ N such that
pnR /∈ (p˜R − ε, p˜R + ε)
With these definitions, we are now ready to state Results 3.
Result 3 In high-stakes games where all equilibria are regular, the following hold:
1. There is a finite number of equilibria, and every equilibrium is either best-response stable
or best-response unstable.
2. If there is a unique equilibrium, then it is best-response stable.
3. If there are multiple equilibria, then there exists a best-response unstable equilibrium and
at least two best-response stable equilibria.
To prove Result 3, we need two intermediate results.
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Lemma 2 Assume (VB − CB)(VA − SA) > 0. Then f ◦ h is strictly increasing in pR, i.e.,
δ(pR; θ) > 0.
Proof. The derivative of f with respect to pF is
DpF f(pF ) = (CB − VB)
φ
(
W¯B − (1−pF )VB−CBpF
)
pF
, (11)
where φ is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. Notice that
if pF > 0, the fraction in Equation 11 divides one positive number by another. Thus, CB >
VB implies DpF f(pF ) > 0, i.e., f is strictly increasing in pF . Likewise, CB < VB implies
DpF f(pF ) < 0, i.e., f is strictly decreasing in pF . Similar computations show that VA > SA
implies h is strictly increasing in pR, and VA < SA implies h is strictly decreasing in pR.
There are two cases to consider. First (VB−CB) > 0 and (VA−SA) > 0. If (VA−SA) > 0,
then h is strictly increasing. Because the range of h is positive, (VB − CB) > 0 and the
above analysis implies f ◦ h is strictly increasing because it is the composition of two strictly
increasing functions. A similar argument holds for the second case where (VB − CB) < 0
and (VA − SA) < 0 because the composition of two strictly decreasing functions is strictly
increasing.
Notice that a high-stakes game satisfies the assumption in Lemma 2 because high-stakes
games have VB > CB and VA > SA. This assumption relaxes Condition ??, and Result 3 still
holds under the more general assumption that (VB − CB)(VA − SA) > 0. The next theorem
states a standard result in nonlinear dynamics and fixed point iteration. See Theorem 6.5 in
Holmgren (1994).
Theorem 2 Consider an equilibrium p˜R. If |δ(p˜Rθ)| < 1, then p˜R is best-response stable. If
|δ(p˜R; θ)| > 1, then p˜R is best-response unstable.
To end this Appendix, we prove Result 3.
Proof of Result 3(1). We first prove that all regular equilibria are either best-response stable
or best-response unstable in high-stakes games. By regularity, δ(p˜R; θ) 6= 1 for some equilib-
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rium p˜R and fixed parameters θ. By Lemma 2, δ(p˜R; θ) > 0, which means δ(p˜R; θ) 6= −1. Then
Theorem 2 implies that equilibrium p˜ is either best-response stable or best-response unstable.
Second, we prove that there is a finite number of equilibria. By assumption all equilibria
are regular, which implies DpRF (p˜R; θ) 6= 0 for all p˜R such that F (p˜R; θ) = 0. Then the
Implicit Function Theorem implies that every equilibrium p˜R is locally isolated. Because F
is continuous, it has closed level sets, so the set of equilibria is closed. Because equilibria
fall within the interval (0, 1), the set of equilibria is bounded, and therefore compact. As a
compact set of locally isolated points, the equilibrium set is finite.
Proof of Result 3(2). Let p˜
[1]
R be the smallest equilibrium, i.e., p˜
[1]
R solves
min {p˜R ∈ [0, 1] | F (p˜R; θ) = 0} .
Such a solution exists because the equilibrium set is non-empty (Result 1) and finite (Result
3(1)). We claim that p˜
[1]
R is best-response stable, i.e.,
∣∣∣δ(p˜[1]R ; θ)∣∣∣ < 1. To see this suppose not.
Then
∣∣∣δ(p˜[1]R ; θ)∣∣∣ ≥ 1. By Lemma 2, δ(p˜[1]R ; θ) > 0 because the game is high-stakes, implying
δ(p˜
[1]
R ; θ) ≥ 1. Regularity then implies δ(p˜[1]R ; θ) > 1.
Because F is continuously differentiable and DpRF = δ(p˜
[1]
R ; θ)− 1, there exists ε > 0 such
that F is strictly increasing on the interval (p˜
[1]
R − ε, p˜[1]R ). Because F (p˜[1]R ; θ) = 0, this implies
that there exists a p′R ∈ (p˜R − ε, p˜[1]R ) such that F (p′R; θ) < 0. By Lemma 1, there exists
ν ∈ (0, p′R) such that F (ν; θ) > 0. Then the Intermediate Value Theorem Implies that there
exists a p˜R ∈ (ν, p′R) such that F (p˜R; θ) = 0, but this contradicts the assumption that p˜[1]R
is the smallest equilibrium. Hence, we conclude that if p˜
[1]
R is the smallest equilibrium, then∣∣∣δ(p[1]R ; θ)∣∣∣ < 1, which implies it is stable by Theorem 2. If there is a unique equilibrium, then
it must be the smallest equilibrium, and it is stable.
Proof of Result 3(3, unstable). We prove that, if there are multiple equilibria, then there exists
a best-response unstable equilibrium. Let p˜
[2]
R be the second smallest equilibrium, i.e., p˜
[2]
R
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solves
min {p˜R ∈ [0, 1] | F (p˜R; θ) = 0} \
{
p˜
[1]
R
}
,
where p˜
[1]
R is the smallest equilibrium defined above. Such a solution exists because there are a
finite number of equilibria and, by assumption, more than one. We claim that
∣∣∣δ(p˜[2]R ; θ)∣∣∣ > 1.
To see this suppose not. Then
∣∣∣δ(p˜[2]R ; θ)∣∣∣ ≤ 1. Because all equilibria are regular, δ(p˜[2]R ; θ) < 1,
implying DpRF (p˜
[2]
R ; θ) < 0. This, along with the facts that F is continuously differentiable
and F (p˜
[2]
R ; θ) = 0, implies there exists (arbitrarily small) ε > 0 such that F (p˜
[2]
R − ε; θ) > 0.
In the proof of Result 3(2), we showed that
∣∣∣δ(p˜[1]R ; θ)∣∣∣ < 1 and F (p˜[1]R ; θ) = 0. Then exists
(arbitrarily small) ν > 0 such that F (p˜
[1]
R + ν; θ) < 0 because F is continuously differentiable.
So we have F (p˜
[2]
R − ε; θ) > 0 and F (p˜[1]R + ν; θ) < 0. Then by the Intermediate Value Theorem
there exists an equilibrium p˜′R such that
p˜
[1]
R + ν < p˜
′
R < p˜
[2]
R − ε.
But this contradicts the assumption that p˜
[2]
R is the second smallest equilibrium. Thus, we
conclude
∣∣∣δ(p˜[2]R ; θ)∣∣∣ > 1. As such, p˜[2]R is unstable.
Proof of Result 3(3, stable). We now prove that, if there are multiple equilibria, then there
exists at least two stable equilibria. First, we claim that if two equilibria exist, then a third
exists as well. To see this, note that we showed that δ(p˜
[2]
R ; θ) > 1 in the proof above. Then
DpRF (p˜
[2]
R ; θ) > 0, so there exists a p
′
R > p˜
[2]
R such that F (p
′
R; θ) > 0. By Lemma 1, there
exists a ν close to 1 such that F (ν; θ) < 0. Then the Intermediate Value Theorem implies
that there exists a third equilibrium, between p′R and ν.
Let p˜
[3]
R satisfy the following:
min {p˜R ∈ [0, 1] | F (p˜R; θ) = 0} \
{
p˜
[1]
R , p˜
[2]
R
}
,
where p˜
[1]
R and p˜
[2]
R are defined above. A solution exists because at least three equilibria exist.
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We claim that p˜
[3]
R is best-response stable. If not, then δ(p˜
[3]
R ; θ) > 1 identical arguments from
the proof of Result 3(1). Then there exists (arbitrarily small) ε > 0 such that F (p˜
[3]
R −ε; θ) < 0.
However, δ(p˜
[2]
R ; θ) > 1, so there exists (arbitrarily small) µ > 0 such that F (p˜
[2]
R + µ; θ) > 0.
Then the Intermediate Value Theorem implies there exists an equilibrium strictly between p˜
[2]
R
and p˜
[3]
R , a contradiction. Thus, p˜
[3]
R is best-response stable. The proof of Result 3(2) shows
that p˜
[1]
R is best-response stable as well. Hence, there are two stable equilibria.
B Further Monte Carlo Results
B.1 Multiple Equilibria
This appendix contains additional results from the Monte Carlo experiment where the
data are generated under parameters that are consistent with multiple equilibria. A single
covariate determines the equilibirum selection. The parameter values used to generate the
data can be found in Table 1. Here we consider the estimators’ bias, variance, and rate of
convergence. Root mean squared error and computation time are both presented in the main
text.
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Figure 8: Bias in signaling estimators with multiple equilibria.
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Figure 9: Variance in signaling estimators with multiple equilibria.
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Figure 10: Convergence rates in signaling estimators with multiple equilibria.
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Figure 11: Computational time in signaling estimators with multiple equilibria.
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B.2 Unique Equilibrium
This appendix contains additional results from the Monte Carlo experiment where the data
are generated from a version of the game with a unique equilibrium. The parameter values
used to generate the data can be found in the final column of Table 1. Here we consider the
estimators’ bias, variance, computation time, and rate of convergence.
Figure 12: Bias in signaling estimators with a unique equilibrium.
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Figure 13: Variance in signaling estimators with a unique equilibrium.
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Figure 14: Computational time in signaling estimators with a unique equilibrium.
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Figure 15: Convergence rates in signaling estimators with a unqiue equilibrium.
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B.3 Best-Response Stability
The best performing solutions make use of best response functions, which begs the ques-
tion: How sensitive are the estimators to best-response unstable equilibria? To answer this
question, we conduct another Monte Carlo experiment. Here, we assume payoffs are generated
as in the multiple setting in Table 1, and the equilibrium selection rule follows the left-hand
graph in Figure 2. Let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the percentage of unstable equilibria. For q ·D dyads,
xd is draw from a uniform distribution over the interval (
1
3
, 2
3
). For the remaining D − q ·D
observations, xd is drawn uniformly from the intervals (0,
1
3
) or (2
3
, 1) with equal probability.
From the formal arguments in the Appendix, the middle equilibrium, i.e., the one selected
when xd ∈ (13 , 23), is unstable.20 As we vary q from 0 to 1, we analyze how the estimators’
performance varies as the data are generated with a larger proportion of best-response unsta-
ble equilibria. In this experiment, we set D = 500 and T = 500, which means there is a large
amount of data as to better isolate the affects of unstable equilibria. For all values of q, we
draw xd, select the corresponding equilibria, and estimate the model 1, 000 times. We expect
the PL and NPL to perform worse as q approaches 1.
Figure 16 summarizes the results, where we vary the percentage of unstable equilibria
along the horizontal axis and plot log RMSE along the vertical axis. Unsurprisingly, the PL
and the NPL have larger RMSE as the data are generated with larger proportions of unstable
equilibria, and this trend appears in the remaining estimators as well. For data with less than
40% unstable equilibria, the NPL outperforms the PL, and vice versa for data with more than
40% unstable equilibria. More surprisingly, we find that the PL and NPL perform better than
the remaining estimators even when more than 75% of observations are drawn from unstable
equilibria. Thus, best-response instability is a problem for all estimators that we consider as
more unstable equilibria generally increase RMSE. The two estimators that explicitly rely on
best-response iteration, however, have the best performance.
What explains this unintuitive finding? We note two possibilities. First, with T = 500,
20See the Proof of Result 3(3). Unstable equilibria can also be identified numerically using Theorem 2.
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Figure 16: RMSE in signaling estimators with more unstable equilibria.
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there is a large amount of within game observations, leading to precise first-stage estimates.
Thus, even if an estimation routine relies on best-response iteration, the first-stage estimates
may be precise enough where only minimal problems arise. Second, Figure 16 only reports
results that have converged, and we find that when unstable equilibria dominate in the data,
convergence of all estimators decreases. This trend is illustrated in Figure 17, where horizontal
axis is the proportion of observations with unstable equilibria and the vertical axis is the pro-
portion of bootstraps converged. Notice, convergence rates of all estimators, besides the PL,
decrease once the proportion of unstable equilibria approaches 60–80%.21 Thus, conditional
on converging, the estimators return results with fairly reasonable RMSE even with a large
proportion of unstable equilibria. They are all generally less likely to converge when unstable
equilibria permeate the data, however.
21We find that the convergence rate of the CMLE method is decreasing in the number of dyads, D. This
is not surprising as the method requires estimating D equilibrium constraints in a highly nonlinear problem.
When D ≤ 200, the CMLE’s convergence rate is between 80–100%. See Figures 10 and 15 in Appendices B.1
and B.2, respectively, for more information.
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Figure 17: Convergence rates in signaling estimators with unstable equilibria.
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C CMLE Implementation
In our economic sanctions application we fit the CMLE using the program IPOPT (Interior
Point OPTimizer), which is an open-source optimizer designed to handle large scale problems
(Wa¨chter and Biegler 2006). In trials, IPOPT had better performance properties than other
optimizers such as sequential quadratic solvers (found in Python’s scipy.optimize mod-
ule and MATLAB) and a version of the Augmented Lagrangian Method (from R’s alabama
package, used for Monte Carlo analysis).
The main difficulty in using interior-point methods is that they require an accurate second
derivative of the Lagrangian associated with the problem in Equation 10. We find that finite
difference approximations are insufficient. As such, we use the program ADOL-C, software for
algorithmic differentiation (AD) (Griewank, Juedes and Utke 1996), to precisely compute the
Hessian. The AD software allows us to only supply the log-likelihood and constraint function
from Equation 10. The AD program repeatedly applies the chain rule to our functions to com-
pute first- and second-order derivatives. In our economic sanctions example, we use IPOPT
and ADOL-C within Python 2.7.13 on UbuntuGNOME 17.04 by calling the pyipopt module
developed by Xu (2014) and the pyadolc module developed by Walter (2014), respectively.
Finally, we estimate standard errors using Silvey (1959, Lemma 6, p. 401).
To demonstrate the trade offs of these two approaches we conduct an additional Monte
Carlo comparing IPOPT-AD (Python) to the Augmented Lagrangian (R) in terms of statis-
tical performance (RMSE), computation time, and convergence rate. Also included are the
pseudo-likelihood methods, which serve as a benchmark. The data generating process uses the
multiple equilibrium setup (first column of Table 1). In Figure 18, we see that while the Aug-
mented Lagrangian (R) of the CMLE is sometimes better or worse than the pseudo-likelihood,
the interior point method (Python) is almost always superior. This performance enhancement
comes from the inclusion of high quality first and second order derivatives through, which
greatly decreases the variance of the estimates. These improvements are not free, however,
as we observe in Figure 19 that the interior point method suffers from a frequent failure to
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Figure 18: Comparing CMLE implementations: RMSE
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converge. On the other hand, we note in Figure 20 that the two approaches require roughly
similar amounts of time, with the interior point method sometimes taking an average of 2-3
additional minutes longer. This trade-off between statistical and computational performance
should be considered on a case-by-case basis when fitting these models.
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Figure 19: Comparing CMLE implementations: Convergence
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Figure 20: Comparing CMLE Computation time
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D Traditional ML and Starting Values
Our Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that the tMLE may not be consistent even
when there is a unique equilibrium in the signaling game from the data generating process.
The reason such problems arise is that the maximization routine will oftentimes evaluate
the likelihood function at a guess of the parameters where multiple equilibria arise. In this
case, the traditional approach will select an equilibrium in an ad-hoc fashion, which may
encourage the maximization routine to move away from the correct parameters. This may be
surprising as both Jo (2011a) and Bas, Signorino and Whang (2014) conduct similar Monte
Carlo experiments and conclude that the tMLE performs well when the data were generated
with parameters that admit a unique equilibrium.22
To the best of our knowledge, the differences arise from starting values. In our study,
starting values for θ were drawn from a standard uniform distribution, and we the starting
values for all four estimators in each simulation. In Jo (2011a), they were the values from
the data generating process (Jo 2011b). Although we were not able to locate replication
materials from Bas, Signorino and Whang (2014), we do conduct an additional Monte Carlo
experiment to investigate the possibility that differences in starting values lead to different
results. To do this, we replicate our unique equilibrium Monte Carlo experiment. We estimate
the model using the pseudo-likelihood routine, a tMLE routine with starting values from the
data generating process, i.e., the parameters listed in the unique column of Table 1, and a
tMLE routine with starting values from the pseudo-likelihood output.
Figure 21 graphs the median (over the parameters) logged RMSE of the three estimation
procedures as we vary the number of dyads D and the number of observations T . In a similar
manner, Figures 22 and 23 report the estimators’ bias and variance, respectively. There
are two major takeaways. First, if the tMLE has privileged starting values, either from the
22Jo (2011a, p. 357) writes “It is easy to see that when there is a unique equilibrium, the estimates get
closer to their true values as the number of observations increases.” Bas, Signorino and Whang (2014, p. 26)
write “All coefficients on average are estimated very close to the true parameter values, and the accuracy of
the estimates increases as the sample size increases.”
48
Figure 21: RMSE with a unique equilibrium and different starting values.
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Caption: Graphs of the estimators’ RMSE as a function of the number of games D and the number of within
game observations T . The figure graphs the median log-RMSE over the parameters in the unique column from
Table 1.
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Figure 22: Bias with a unique equilibrium and different starting values.
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Caption: Graphs of the estimators’ bias as a function of the number of games D and the number of within
game observations T . The figure graphs the median bias over the parameters in the unique column from Table
1.
truthful values or the PL estimates, then it generally performs as well as (if not better than)
the pseudo-likelihood estimator. This stands in stark contrast to the results in Figure 5,
where the tMLE performs substantially worse than the PL routine. Second, if T = 5, then
the pseudo-likelihood estimator appears to perform better than either of the tMLE routines
even though one of these routines was provided the correct estimates as starting values. This
improvement is mostly driven by the relatively smaller variance in the PL method. Given these
results, we conclude different choices in starting values generate the contradictory findings in
previous work.
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Figure 23: Variance with a unique equilibrium and different starting values.
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Caption: Graphs of the estimators’ variance as a function of the number of games D and the number of
within game observations T . The figure graphs the median variance over the parameters in the unique column
from Table 1.
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E Traditional ML and Equation Solvers
Table 4: Effects of Equation Solver on tMLE
tML tML
Broyden Solver Select Largest Eq.
Model 1 Model 2
SA: Econ. DepA 0.05 −0.38
(0.29) (0.27)
SA: DemA 0.00 0.03
∗
(0.00) (0.01)
SA: Contiguity 0.27
∗ 0.28∗
(0.10) (0.02)
SA: Alliance −0.06 0.38∗
(0.08) (0.05)
VA: Const. −0.06 −0.14
(0.08) (0.09)
VA: CostsA −0.04 −1.71∗
(0.03) (0.26)
CB: Const. 0.81 1.08
∗
(0.91) (0.31)
CB: Econ. DepB −0.21 0.23∗
(0.16) (0.10)
CB: CostsB −0.08∗ −0.12∗
(0.03) (0.01)
CB: Contiguity −0.25∗ −0.15∗
(0.02) (0.01)
CB: Alliance 0.10 −0.37∗
(0.09) (0.04)
W¯A: Const. −0.15 −0.41∗
(0.78) (0.14)
W¯A: Econ. DepA 0.07 0.3
(0.75) (0.32)
W¯A: DemA 0.01 0.06
∗
(0.01) (0.01)
W¯A: Cap. Ratio −0.01 0.07∗
(0.01) (0.01)
W¯B: Const. −0.38 1.19∗
(1.13) (0.40)
W¯B: DemB 0.01
∗ 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00)
W¯B: Cap. Ratio 0.01 −0.05∗
(0.01) (0.02)
a¯: Const. −0.56 −0.76∗
(0.77) (0.14)
a¯: DemA 0.00 0.06
∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Log L -4102.76 -4302.08
N 418× 120 418× 120
Notes: ∗p < 0.05
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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F R Code
Below we list the basic code required to use any of the estimation routines found in this
paper. The complete code used to replicate this entire paper can be found in the replication
archive.
1 ##
2 ## This f i l e c o n t a i n s code f o r the EQ c o n s t r a i n t i n Jo (2011) .
3 ## I t a l s o i n c l u d e s f u n c t i o n s f o r g e n e r a t i n g data and f u n c t i o n s
4 ## nec e s s a r y to implement the f o u r e s t im a t o r s .
5 ## Add i t i o n a l packages : pbivnorm , r oo tSo l v e , maxLik
6 ##
7
8 ################## HELPER FUNCTIONS ##################
9 vec2U . r e g r <− f u n c t i o n ( x , r e g r ) {
10 ## Funct i on f o r c o n v e r t i n g pa ramete r s and r e g r e s s o r s to
11 ## u t i l i t i e s ove r outcomes
12 ## INPUTS :
13 ## x : v e c t o r o f r e g r e s s i o n pa ramete r s ( b e t a s ) i n the o r d e r SA , VA, CB,
barWA , barWB , bara , VB
14 ## re g r : a l i s t o f r e g r e s s o r mat r i c e s , one f o r each u t i l i t y i n the same
o r d e r as x
15 ## OUTPUTS:
16 ## param : A l i s t o f u t i l i t i e s i n the same o r d e r as r e g r .
17 ## Each e lement o f t h i s l i s t i s a v e c t o r o f l e n g t h equa l
18 ## to the number o f games .
19
20
21 ## c r e a t e i n d i c e s to a p p r o p r i a t e l y s o r t the e l ement s o f x
22 ## in t o the c o r r e c t outcomes .
23 i d x0 <− l a p p l y ( r eg r , n co l )
24 i d x0 <− s a pp l y ( idx0 , f u n c t i o n ( x ) { i f ( i s . n u l l ( x ) ) {0} e l s e {x }})
25 i d x1 <− cumsum( i d x0 )
26 i d x0 <− i dx1−i d x0+1
27 i d x <− r b i n d ( idx0 , i d x1 )
28 i d x [ , app l y ( idx , 2 , f u n c t i o n ( x ) {x [1]> x [ 2 ] } ) ] <− 0
29 i d x [ , app l y ( idx , 2 , f u n c t i o n ( x ) {x [1]==x [ 2 ] } ) ] <− r b i n d (0 , i d x [ 1 , app l y ( idx
, 2 , f u n c t i o n ( x ) {x [1]==x [ 2 ] } ) ] )
30
31 i ndx <− l i s t ( i d x [ 1 , 1 ] : i d x [ 2 , 1 ] ,
32 i d x [ 1 , 2 ] : i d x [ 2 , 2 ] ,
33 i d x [ 1 , 3 ] : i d x [ 2 , 3 ] ,
34 i d x [ 1 , 4 ] : i d x [ 2 , 4 ] ,
35 i d x [ 1 , 5 ] : i d x [ 2 , 5 ] ,
36 i d x [ 1 , 6 ] : i d x [ 2 , 6 ] ,
37 i d x [ 1 , 7 ] : i d x [ 2 , 7 ] )
38 i ndx <− l a p p l y ( indx ,
39 f u n c t i o n ( x ) {
40 i f (0 %i n% x ) {
41 r e t u r n ( x [ l e n g t h ( x ) ] )
42 } e l s e {
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43 r e t u r n ( x )
44 }
45 }
46 )
47
48
49 ## Create the u t i l i t i e s u s i n g s imp l e X ∗ beta
50 param <− l i s t (barWA = r e g r [ [ 4 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 4 ] ] ] ,
51 barWB = r e g r [ [ 5 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 5 ] ] ] ,
52 bara = r e g r [ [ 6 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 6 ] ] ] ,
53 VA = r e g r [ [ 2 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 2 ] ] ] ,
54 VB = r e g r [ [ 7 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 7 ] ] ] ,
55 SA = r e g r [ [ 1 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 1 ] ] ] ,
56 CB = r e g r [ [ 3 ] ] %∗% x [ i ndx [ [ 3 ] ] ] ,
57 s i g = 1)
58 param <− l a p p l y ( param , as . numer ic )
59 r e t u r n ( param )
60 }
61
62 ## Func t i on s from Jo (2011)
63 cS ta r . j o <− f u n c t i o n (p , U) {
64 ## r e t u r n s c∗ , a v a l u e tha t appea r s f r e q u e n t l y
65 ## p are the e q u i l i b r i um p r o b a b i l i t i e s p R
66 r e t u r n ( (U$SA − (1−p ) ∗U$VA) /p )
67 }
68
69
70 g . j o <− f u n c t i o n ( c ,U) {
71 ## r e t u r n s p C f o r a g i v en v a l u e o f c ( from cS ta r . jo , above ) and U
72 v1 <− ( c−U$barWA) /U$ s i g
73 v2 <− ( c−U$bara ) /U$ s i g
74 r e t u r n (1 − pnorm ( v1 ) ∗pnorm ( v2 ) )
75 }
76
77
78 h . j o <− f u n c t i o n ( c , U) {
79 ## r e t u r n s p F f o r a g i v en v a l u e o f c ( from cS ta r . jo , above ) and U
80 d1 <− (U$barWA − U$bara ) / (U$ s i g ∗ s q r t (2 ) )
81 d2 <− (U$barWA − c ) / (U$ s i g )
82 r e t u r n ( pbivnorm ( d1 , d2 , rho=1/ s q r t (2 ) ) )
83 }
84
85 f . j o <− f u n c t i o n (p , U) {
86 ## r e t u r n s p R f o r a g i v en v a l u e o f p F ( from h . jo , above ) and U
87 r e t u r n ( pnorm ( ( p∗U$barWB + (1−p ) ∗U$VB − U$CB) / (U$ s i g ∗p ) ) )
88 }
89
90 con s t . j o <− f u n c t i o n (p , U) {
91 ## Funct i on to compute the e q u i l i b i r um c o n s t r a i n t p R − f ( h ( p R)
92 c <− cS ta r . j o (p ,U)
93 g . j o <− g . j o ( c ,U)
94 g . j o [ g . jo<=.Machine$ doub l e . eps ] <− . Machine$ doub l e . eps ##numer ic
s t a b i l i t y
95 j <− h . j o ( c ,U) /g . j o
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96 r e t u r n ( p − f . j o ( j ,U) )
97 }
98
99
100 eqProbs <− f u n c t i o n (p , U, RemoveZeros=F) {
101 ## This f u n c t i o n g e n e r a t e s p C and p F from e q u i l i b r i um
102 ## p r o b a b i l i t y p R
103 ## INPUTS :
104 ## p : p R ( the e q u i l i b r i um )
105 ## U: U t i l i t i e s ( from vec2U . r eg r , above )
106 ## RemoveZeros : Boolean , shou l d the f u n c t i o n check f o r numer ic i s s u e s ?
107 ## OUTPUTS: A mat r i x o f M by 3 (M i s the number o f games )
108
109 ck <− cS ta r . j o (p ,U)
110 pC <− g . j o ( ck , U)
111 i f ( RemoveZeros ) {
112 pC [ pC <= . Machine$ doub l e . eps ] <− . Machine$ doub l e . eps
113 }
114 pF <− h . j o ( ck , U) /pC
115 r e t u r n ( cb ind (p , pC , pF ) )
116 }
117
118 ################## Ob j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s ##################
119
120
121 LL . j o <− f u n c t i o n ( x , Y, r e g r ) {
122 ## Log− l i k e l i h o o d f u n c t i o n f o r the CMLE
123 ## INPUTS :
124 ## x : v e c t o r o f c u r r e n t paramete r gu e s s e s i n o r d e r ( beta , p )
125 ## Y: 4 by M mat r i x o f t a bu l a t e d outcomes
126 ## re g r : l i s t o f r e g r e s s o r s f o r each u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n
127 ## OUTPUTS:
128 ## LL : n e g a t i v e o f the log− l i k e l i h o o d f o r t h i s s e t o f pa ramete r s
129
130 M <− dim (Y) [ 2 ]
131 xP <− p l o g i s ( x [ ( l e n g t h ( x )−M+1) : l e n g t h ( x ) ] ) #t r an s f o rm p R to [ 0 , 1 ]
132 xT <− x [ 1 : ( l e n g t h ( x )−M) ] #beta
133
134 U <− vec2U . r e g r (xT , r e g r ) #conv e r t beta and r e g r to u t i l i t i e s
135 EQ <− eqProbs (xP ,U,T)
136 OUT <− cb ind (1−EQ[ , 2 ] ,
137 EQ[ , 2 ] ∗(1−EQ[ , 1 ] ) ,
138 EQ[ , 2 ] ∗EQ[ , 1 ] ∗EQ[ , 3 ] ,
139 EQ[ , 2 ] ∗EQ[ , 1 ] ∗(1−EQ[ , 3 ] ) )
140 OUT[OUT<=sq r t ( . Machine$ doub l e . eps ) ] <− s q r t ( . Machine$ doub l e . eps )
141 LL <− sum( l og ( t (OUT) ) ∗Y) #l i k e l i h o o d
142 r e t u r n (−LL )
143 }
144
145
146 QLL . j o <− f u n c t i o n ( x , PRhat , PFhat ,Y, r e g r ) {
147 ## Pseudo−l og− l i k e l i h o o d f o r two s t ep method
148 ## INPUTS :
149 ## x : v e c t o r o f c u r r e n t paramete r gu e s s e s i n o r d e r ( beta , p )
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150 ## PRhat : F i r s t s t a g e e s t ima t e s o f p R
151 ## PFhat : F i r s t s t ag e e s t ima t e s o f p F
152 ## Y: 4 by M mat r i x o f t a bu l a t e d outcomes
153 ## re g r : l i s t o f r e g r e s s o r s f o r each u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n
154 ## OUTPUTS:
155 ## QLL : n e g a t i v e o f the PLL f o r t h i s s e t o f pa ramete r s
156
157 U <− vec2U . r e g r ( x , r e g r )
158 PR <− f . j o ( PFhat , U)
159 PR[PR<=.Machine$ doub l e . eps ] <− . Machine$ doub l e . eps
160 PC <− g . j o ( cS t a r . j o ( PRhat ,U) ,U)
161 PC[PC<=.Machine$ doub l e . eps ] <− . Machine$ doub l e . eps
162 PF <− h . j o ( cS t a r . j o ( PRhat ,U) ,U) /PC
163
164 OUT <− cb ind (1−PC,
165 PC∗(1−PR) ,
166 PC∗PR∗PF ,
167 PC∗PR∗(1−PF) )
168 OUT[OUT<=sq r t ( . Machine$ doub l e . eps ) ] <− s q r t ( . Machine$ doub l e . eps )
169 QLL <− sum( l og ( t (OUT) ) ∗Y)
170 r e t u r n (−QLL)
171 }
172
173
174 LL . n fxp <− f u n c t i o n ( x , Y, r e g r ) {
175 ## Log− l i k e l i h o o d f u n c t i o n f o r the Nested F i xed Po in t
176 ## INPUTS :
177 ## x : v e c t o r o f c u r r e n t paramete r gu e s s e s i n o r d e r ( beta , p )
178 ## Y: 4 by M mat r i x o f t a bu l a t e d outcomes
179 ## re g r : l i s t o f r e g r e s s o r s f o r each u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n
180 ## OUTPUTS:
181 ## LL : n e g a t i v e o f the log− l i k e l i h o o d f o r t h i s s e t o f pa ramete r s
182
183 M <− dim (Y) [ 2 ]
184 U <− vec2U . r e g r ( x , r e g r )
185
186 ## compute AN equ l i b r i um
187 f <− f u n c t i o n ( p ) { con s t . j o (p ,U) }
188 g r f <− f u n c t i o n ( p ) { d i ag (1− e v a l g r fh (p ,U) ) }
189 out <− mu l t i r o o t ( f , r ep ( . 5 , M) , j a c f u n c=gr f , j a c t y p e=” f u l l u s r ” ,
190 c t o l=1e−6, r t o l=1e−6, a t o l=1e−6)
191
192 EQ <− eqProbs ( out $ root ,U)
193 OUT <− cb ind (1−EQ[ , 2 ] ,
194 EQ[ , 2 ] ∗(1−EQ[ , 1 ] ) ,
195 EQ[ , 2 ] ∗EQ[ , 1 ] ∗EQ[ , 3 ] ,
196 EQ[ , 2 ] ∗EQ[ , 1 ] ∗(1−EQ[ , 3 ] ) )
197 OUT[OUT<=sq r t ( . Machine$ doub l e . eps ) ] <− s q r t ( . Machine$ doub l e . eps )
198 LL <− sum( l og ( t (OUT) ) ∗Y)
199 r e t u r n (−LL )
200 }
201
202 con s t . cmle <− f u n c t i o n ( x ,Y, r e g r ) {
203 ## Con s t r a i n t f u n c t i o n f o r the CMLE
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204 ## INPUTS :
205 ## x : v e c t o r o f c u r r e n t paramete r gu e s s e s i n o r d e r ( beta , p )
206 ## Y: 4 by M mat r i x o f t a bu l a t e d outcomes
207 ## re g r : l i s t o f r e g r e s s o r s f o r each u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n
208 ## OUTPUTS:
209 ## v i o : Con s t r a i n t v i o l a t i o n p R − f ( h ( p R ; beta ) )
210
211 M <− dim (Y) [ 2 ]
212 xP <− p l o g i s ( x [ ( l e n g t h ( x )−M+1) : l e n g t h ( x ) ] ) #conv e r t to [ 0 , 1 ]
213 xT <− x [ 1 : ( l e n g t h ( x )−M) ]
214
215 U <− vec2U . r e g r (xT , r e g r )
216 v i o <− con s t . j o ( xP , U)
217 r e t u r n ( v i o )
218 }
219
220 np l <− f u n c t i o n ( p l . hat , Phat , Y, r eg r , max i t =500 , t o l=1e−5){
221 ## Est ima t e s the NPL model s t a r t i n g at PL e s t ima t e s .
222 ## INPUTS :
223 ## p l . hat : v e c t o r o f beta e s t ima t e s from the PL model
224 ## Phat : l e n g t h 2 l i s t o f f i r s t s t a g e e s t ima t e s , PRhat and PFhat
225 ## Y: 4 by M mat r i x o f t a bu l a t e d outcomes
226 ## re g r : l i s t o f r e g r e s s o r s f o r each u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n
227 ## maxit : Maximum number o f i t e r a t i o n s
228 ## t o l : User s p e c i f i e d s t ep t o l e r a n c e f o r ( beta , pR , pF )
229 ## OUTPUTS:
230 ## np l . out : L i s t c o n t a i n i n g
231 ## − NPL e s t ima t e s ( beta )
232 ## − F i n a l b e s t r e s pon s e update o f pR
233 ## − F i n a l b e s t r e s pon s e update o f pF
234 ## − Convergence code
235 ## ∗ 1 : G rad i en t c l o s e to z e r o at f i n a l i n n e r s t ep
236 ## ∗ 2 : Step t o l e r a n c e s t a t i s f i e d at f i n a l i n n e r s t ep
237 ## ∗ −69: Maximum out i t e r a t i o n s exceded
238 ## ∗ −99: Other e r r o r
239 ## − Number o f ou t e r i t e r a t i o n s
240
241 #Setup
242 e v a l <− I n f
243 i t e r <− 0
244 out .NPL <− l i s t ( e s t ima t e = p l . hat )
245 f q l l <− f u n c t i o n ( x ) { #PL l i k e l i h o o d
246 −QLL . j o ( x , Phat$PRhat , Phat$PFhat , Y, r e g r )
247 }
248 gr . q l l <− f u n c t i o n ( x ) { #PL g r a d i e n t
249 −e v a l g r q l l ( x , Phat$PRhat , Phat$PFhat , Y, r e g r )
250 }
251 wh i l e ( e v a l > t o l & i t e r < maxit ) {
252 Uk <− vec2U . r e g r ( out .NPL$ es t imate , r e g r )
253 Pk . F <− eqProbs ( Phat$PRhat , Uk , RemoveZeros = T) [ , 3 ]
254 Pk .R <− pnorm ( ( Phat$PFhat∗Uk$barWB + (1−Phat$PFhat ) ∗Uk$VB − Uk$CB) /Phat
$PFhat )
255 Phat . k 1 <− Phat
256 Phat <− l i s t ( PRhat = Pk .R , PFhat = Pk . F)
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257
258 #no rma l i z e
259 Phat$PRhat <− pmin (pmax ( Phat$PRhat , 0 . 0001) , . 9999 )
260 Phat$PFhat <− pmin (pmax ( Phat$PFhat , 0 . 0001) , . 9999 )
261
262 out .NPL . k <− t r y ( maxLik ( s t a r t=out .NPL$ es t imate , l o g L i k=f q l l , g rad=gr .
q l l , method=”NR” ) )
263 i f ( c l a s s ( out .NPL . k [ [ 1 ] ] )==” c h a r a c t e r ” | | out .NPL . k$ code==100){ #maxLik
f a i l u r e
264 out .NPL <− out .NPL . k
265 break
266 }
267 out .NPL . k$ conve rgence <− out .NPL . k$ code
268 e v a l <− mean ( ( c ( out .NPL . k$ e s t imate , u n l i s t ( Phat ) ) −c ( out .NPL$ es t imate ,
u n l i s t ( Phat . k 1) ) ) ˆ2)
269 out .NPL <− out .NPL . k
270 i t e r <− i t e r + 1
271 }
272 i f ( c l a s s ( out .NPL [ [ 1 ] ] )==” ch a r a c t e r ” | | out .NPL . k$ code==100){ #i f t h e r e
was a f a i l u r e
273 out .NPL$ e s t ima t e <− r ep (NA, 6)
274 out .NPL$ conve rgence <− −99
275 out .NPL$ i t e r <− −99
276 } e l s e {
277 out .NPL$ conve rgence <− i f e l s e ( i t e r==maxit , −69, out .NPL$ conve rgence )
278 out .NPL$ conve rgence <− i f e l s e ( e v a l==0, −99, out .NPL$ conve rgence )
279 }
280 np l . out <− l i s t ( par = out .NPL$ es t imate ,
281 PRhat = Phat$PRhat ,
282 PFhat = Phat$PFhat ,
283 conve rgence = out .NPL$ convergence ,
284 i t e r = out .NPL$ i t e r )
285 r e t u r n ( np l . out )
286 }
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